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REINVENTING COMMON INTEREST
DEVELOPMENTS: REFLECTIONS ON A
POLICY ROLE FOR THE JUDICIARY
EvAN MCKENZIE*
[T]he return back from contract to status which we experience today
was greatly facilitated by the fact that the belief in freedom of contract has remained one of the firmest axioms in the whole fabric of
the social philosophy of our culture.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Please consider the following dispute: The plaintiff is a nonprofit corporation with voluntary membership, and it is dedicated
to the improvement of property values and the quality of life in the
community. The corporation is suing one of its members to enforce
the terms of a contractual agreement to which all the members are
parties. Regularly elected corporate directors approved filing this
lawsuit. The plaintiffs articles of incorporation and bylaws plainly
state that it was created to enforce the contract.
State law
authorizes the activities of the corporation. There is substantial
evidence that the defendant's actions constituted a breach of the
terms of the contract.
Is there anything useful for society to do in this situation,
* Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois at Chicago; J.D. 1972, University of California at Los Angeles; Ph.D. 1989, University of Southern California. This paper was delivered at the John Marshall
Law School as part of the 1997 Robert Kratovil Memorial Seminar in Real Estate Law, entitled "Reinventing America's Master Planned Communities," and
has been subsequently revised for publication purposes. I have made every
effort to present essential points in the text, rather than in footnotes. I hope
in this way to retain some of the character of the original public address and
maximize the accessibility of the article to non-lawyer readers who might be
involved or interested in the policy area. I would like to acknowledge the able
legal research assistance provided by Gus Sparagis, The John Marshall Law
School, J.D. Candidate 1998, which was made possible by Professor Celeste
Hammond, Director of the Center for Real Estate Law at the John Marshall
Law School. I am also grateful to the Office of Social Science Research and
the Great Cities Institute at the University of Illinois at Chicago, whose support has enabled me to consider some of the public policy issues discussed
herein.
1. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion--Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 641 (1943).
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acting in its collective capacity through public policy, other than
providing a court to ensure that the terms of the contract are enforced? Most judges, lawyers and legal scholars would answer the
question "no." But what if the following facts are added?
1) The "community" is not a town or village, but a corporation
representing all the people who own housing units in a masterplanned private subdivision. Resident participation in the affairs
of the corporation is minimal, and an elected, uncompensated
board of owner-directors operates the association. Absentee owners, who rent their units and live elsewhere, can vote, but the
people who rent their units and live in the development cannot.
2) The association provides some services to the members that
would otherwise be provided by local government.
3) The "contract" is in fact a 200-page adhesion contract,
which is merely a stack of non-negotiable, standardized boilerplate
provisions. The majority of property owners have not read it, but
if they had, it is doubtful that many of them would have understood it without legal advice. Lawyers drafted the contract for a
real estate developer who no longer has any financial interest in
the properties, and all the terms were recorded with the deeds at
the time of subdivision. To prevent residents from changing the
developer's rules, the drafters included virtually insurmountable
super-majority requirements.
4) The "voluntary membership" of each resident in the corporation started automatically at the moment of purchase and can
only be ended by selling the home and leaving the community.
5) Many of the terms of the contract seem perfectly reasonable, but others seem oppressive, and a few even seem to violate
fundamental liberties or the ordinary expectations of homeowners
like the defendant.
6) The defendant's actions, although constituting technical
violations of the rules, did not harm any resident's quality of life or
property values. The corporate directors were advised that they
should prosecute all violations, no matter how trivial, or risk being
sued themselves.
7) A few interest groups, and mainly a single trade association, representing those who make their living working for organizations like the plaintiff, influenced the state laws under which the
association operates. There is no significant interest group representation of the residents, who are dis-aggregated consumers of a
mass produced commodity. There is no regulatory agency overseeing the activities of organizations like this corporation.
8) The dispute is repeated in virtually identical form thousands of times in courts across the country, because millions of
Americans are parties to similar contracts.
These additional facts transform the situation from a private
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dispute to one that raises significant public policy questions.2 In
other situations where the widespread use of contracts to structure
private relationships seemed to implicate important public values,
government has become involved. Examples of this include areas
such as product liability, worker safety, child labor, race restrictive
covenants and landlord-tenant relationships.
In some of these cases, legislatures have conducted investigations, enacted protective legislation and even created regulatory
agencies. But where legislatures have not responded, courts have
sometimes gone beyond passively enforcing the terms of standardized contracts, and have become more assertively involved in
structuring contractual relationships that implicate significant
public values. This involvement has included interpretation and
application of constitutional principles, ordinary legislation, common law doctrines of contract and tort, and principles of equity.
Please consider these observations:
First, the rise of common interest housing has created a
situation in which private contracts are being used to structure
relationships involving important public 3 values, institutions, consequences and issues. This phenomenon is a form of privatization
which, taken as a whole, would justify a substantial degree of government involvement, although there is no simple answer as to
what forms that involvement should take in particular circumstances. 4

2. Because the study of public policy is not the monopoly of any discipline,
the term "public policy" has come to be defined and understood somewhat differently by economists, legal scholars, political scientists, urban planners and
others. Sometimes the term is used relatively narrowly, such as when judges
employ "public policy" considerations in resolving particular issues. One ex-

ample of this is the "public policy exception" to freedom of contract, as discussed in Hurd v. Hodge. 334 U.S. 24, 35-6 (1948). But, when political scientists use the term, it has a much broader meaning, and can encompass almost
any purposive course of action taken through any level of government, such as
when Deborah Stone says, "[p]ublic policy is about communities trying to
achieve something as communities." DEBORAH STONE, POLICY PARADOX: THE
ART OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING 18 (2d ed. 1997). Political scientists with

legal training and experience feel some obligation to acknowledge this as a
potential source of confusion, which will be outweighed by the benefits of
bringing some of the concepts of political science to bear on a legal issue. The
term "public policy" will be used in a broad sense to refer to actions by executive, legislative or judicial branches at the national, state, or local level. Be-

low, however, when speaking of what courts might do in the absence of legislative action, the term will be used in a judicial context.
3. The terms "private" and "public" when reaching this conclusion will be
explained in the text below.
4. See EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE

RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 29-55 (1994) (advancing this ar-

gument in detail). This article does not address the interesting question of
whether homeowner associations are, or should be considered "governments"
for some or all purposes. Instead this article confines itself to arguing that,
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Second, for three decades, the rapid proliferation of common
interest housing has far outpaced the development of public policy
approaches that would address the public issues it presents. As
early as 1964, scholars were raising what have proven to be legitimate, and even critical concerns. However limited, present
policy approaches at the federal and state levels have only promoted common interest development (CID) construction. Public
agencies typically scrutinize developers until the units are sold to
consumers. Thereafter, associations and residents merely finance
the civil court system by litigating the enforcement of processbased regulations, such as requirements for disclosure, meetings,
record keeping and elections. There is little substantive regulation
of the contractual agreements. In forty-nine states, no government
agency is charged with enforcing the regulations after the developer relinquishes control of the project to the homeowners.
Third, legislatures have been, and will probably continue to
be, essentially unresponsive in this issue area, in large part because of collective action problems inherent in the relationship between the parties to the contracts in question.
Fourth, if this dis-juncture between public policy issues and
responses continues, at least three possible sets of adverse consequences could befall the CID housing sector.' These scenarios are
called "emergence of an adversarial relationship with government," "failure from within," and "failure of demand."
Fifth, the unresponsiveness of legislatures and the absence of
regulatory agencies, coupled with the increasing likelihood of adverse consequences, justify increased judicial involvement in structuring the relationships among the parties to CID contracts. One
form of that involvement can be implemented. One argument is
that CID governing documents are a particularly troublesome variety of adhesion contracts, and that proposals which have been
made for the judicial handling of adhesion contracts in general
would be especially appropriate for CID contracts, regardless of
whether such proposals were employed more generally. This apregardless of one's position on the "private government" question, the activities of homeowner associations raise issues of legitimate public concern, and
that courts could and should address these issues. See Id. 122-49 (discussing
homeowners associations as private governments).
5. For analytical purposes, "micropolitics," or the internal working of
common interest developments (CIDs) and the CID housing sector, is distinguished from "macropolitics," or the effects of CIDs on the larger society. An
example of the former would be the relationship between CID residents and
their board of directors. The impact of CIDs on the economic, political, or social workings of cities would be an issue of macro-politics, under this analytical distinction. MCKENZIE, supra note 4, at 18-23. However, there are many
ways in which these issue areas overlap. Id. This article considers the scenarios that emanate from the complex interactions that are occurring in the
area of overlap. Id. These areas are where the relationships are still being
constructed. Id.
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proach is an improvement over the current process regulations,
but less dramatic than proposals to use constitutionalism to regulate CIDs on the theory that they are governments or are engaging
in governmental activity.6
This reform project is approached with some reluctance, because the value of making specific proposals for change is doubtful.
There are several reasons for this reluctance. First, for over three
decades perceptive observers have advanced arguments and made
proposals, attempting to persuade public policy makers of the need
to address this issue area. Yet, during this time, the gap between
what political scientists call the "systemic policy agenda," which is
the list of matters that concern people in the society, and the
"institutional policy agenda," which is the narrower list of issues
actually considered by policy-makers, has grown larger.! This policy gap exists because policy-makers respond to organized interests. In this issue area, the organized interests have been resistant to outside voices and deeply skeptical of government.
Second, making specific reform proposals can distract attention away from a valid general critique, to the merits and shortcomings of the specific solutions proposed, at a time when it might
be more productive to enlarge the conversation over the "need" for
reform, rather than debating any single solution.
Third, from a pragmatic and democratic standpoint, there is
much to be said for being cautious about reform proposals that
might disturb the operation of any social institution, such as the
CID, that has been functioning for decades. Any government intervention carries the risk of unintended consequences. But CIDs
are themselves a type of reform, offered as an improvement over
conventional local government, and the law of unintended consequences also applies to CIDs as presently conceived.
Moreover, it can be argued that the residents of CID communities need to go through a problem solving process collectively in
order to strengthen their civil society institutions. Additionally,
CID residents feel compelled to develop group history and identity,
and arrive at resolutions, if not solutions, they are comfortable

6. See MCKENZIE, supra note 4, at 155-57 (addressing the constitutional
debate). Some CIDs are indistinguishable from the company town which was
held subject to constitutional scrutiny in Marsh v. Alabama. 326 U.S. 501,
502-05 (1946). Based on Marsh, there is a role for constitutionalism in this

policy area. However, another way to address the problem without answering
the question asked is carefully considered by Professor Katherine Rosenberry.
Katherine Rosenberry, Condominium and Homeowner Associations: Should
They Be Treated Like Mini-Governments?, ZONING AND PLANNING LAW
REPORT, May 1985, reprinted in RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS:
PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM? 69-74

(Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations eds., 1989).
7. ROGER W. COBB & CHARLES D. ELDER, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICAN

POLITICS: THE DYNAMICS OF AGENDA BUILDING 14 (2d ed. 1983).
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with. Now, government involvement might hinder that process."
Yet, on balance, the role for the judiciary that is proposed
would benefit at least some of those concerned without significantly harming others. While this may fall short of genuine or
even potential "Pareto optimality," the risks of continued inaction
are substantial and increasing. Nothing proposed in this article
would call into question the continued existence of CID housing.
Indeed, the contrary is true: it would be a stronger institution if
judges took a firmer hand on behalf of sounder public policy. To
argue for a more assertive policy is not to disparage the nongovernmental actors involved, but is a natural result of the complex and ambiguous nature of CIDs, the tasks they were created to
perform, and the ways they carry out these tasks.
II. CID HOUSING AS A PUBLIC POLICY CONCERN
Common interest housing is one example of a more general
trend toward privatization of government functions. 9 Deciding
whether or not to privatize any government activity is fundamentally a matter of public concern, although it raises many difficult
questions regarding how the relationships should be constructed.'0
Yet, where CIDs are concerned, it is often argued to the contrary.
There is something essentially "private" about decisions to construct, sell, purchase, and operate CIDs. Government should presumptively remain uninvolved in the contractual relationships. In
short, it is contended that CIDs should be in some fashion insulated from government, so that in general their activities should be
presumptively deemed not to raise public policy issues.
It is critical to address these claims at the outset, because
they are the rhetorical subtext of the specific policy arguments
used to keep legislatures and courts from intervening, and to keep
the discourse about CIDs as privatized as their activities. The
claims take three general forms, which could be presented in terms
of philosophy, theory, law, or morality, but which will simply be
rendered here in rhetorical terms, because that is the form they
most often take. One is called "defensible space"; a second is
thought of as the "reinventing government" argument; and the
third is the "liberty of contract" claim, which is addressed in more
detail below. Each of these arguments is premised to some degree
on the notion that there is a distinction to be made between what
is "private" and what is "public," so discussion will be prefaced
8. See, e.g., SARA M. EVANS & HARRY C. BOYTE, FREE SPACES: THE
SOURCES OF DEMOCRATIC CHANGE IN AMERICA, 187-90 (1986).
9. See MCKENZIE, supra note 4, at 122-49 (addressing this issue in detail).
10. See generally EMANUEL S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION: THE KEY TO BETTER

GOVERNMENT (1987) (describing four different ways to privatize).

See also

JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION-PUBIC ENDS, PRIVATE
MEANS 10 (1989) (discussing privatization).
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upon the three arguments by briefly considering the so-called
"public-private" distinction.
Few rhetorical devices are more often used, or misused, than
the supposed distinction between public and private. Yet, rarely
do people who use the terms as adjectives explain what they understand them to mean. This omission may rest on the assumption that the meanings are simple and generally known. But those
who have taken the time to study these concepts understand their
complexity.
One of the most thorough treatments of the subject argues
that the quality spoken of as "publicness" and "privateness" has
three different dimensions or meanings." One of these, called
"agency," relates to whether and to what degree the actor, or
agent, in question is governmental. 12 A second, "access," deals with
the relative openness or restrictiveness of the subject.'3 The third,
"interest," addresses the issue of how many people are concerned
with or affected by the subject. 14 A thing may be relatively public
on one dimension and relatively private on another. For example,
if the agency criterion is used, one may say that a shopping mall is
"private" because it is not owned by government, but if we use the
access criterion one might say it is a "public" place because of the
high degree of openness. On the "interest" dimension, questions
might be asked about how many people are concerned with particular mall activities, which would depend on the types of activities."5
So, to be fully "public" something would be governmental,
open to all, and of concern to all. To be fully private, a thing would
be non-governmental, closed and of no concern to any, but one or a
few. But two things are clear: few things are either fully "public"
or "private;" and the distinction between public and private is not
a dichotomy, nor even a continuum, but instead a set of continua.
These meanings are derived from the ways in which we use
these words, so they are widely understood, if not often articulated. But in practice, we rarely specify which meaning we are

11. Stanley I. Benn & Gerald F. Gaus, The Public and the Private:Concepts

and Action, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 7-12 (Stanley I. Berm &
Gerald F. Gaus eds., 1983).
12. See id. at 9-10 (discussing the agency dimension of the quality referred
to as "publicness" and "privateness").
13. See id. at 7-9 (discussing the access dimension of the quality referred to
as "publicness" and "privateness").
14. See id. 7-9 (discussing the interest dimension of the quality referred to
as "publicness" and "privateness").
15. There have been several judicial attempts to address the activities of
shopping malls in terms of constitutional theory, perhaps the most significant
being the United States Supreme Court's ruling in PruneyardShopping Center v. Robins. 447 U.S. 74, 80-88 (1980). See MCKENZIE, supra note 4, at 15762 (discussing this decision and others).
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speaking of when we use the words "public" and "private" in communication. Sometimes the parties know which meaning the
speaker intends; other times there may be an inadvertent miscommunication and the speaker and listener may have different
meanings in mind; and it is also possible to deliberately manipulate, or innocently confuse, the meanings for rhetorical purposes or
when making claims. For example, consider the statement, 'This
is my property (agency), and I do not let anybody enter it (access),
so what goes on here is nobody else's business (interest), and
therefore, 'private,'" which is a "non sequitur," masquerading as a
sensible and moral pronouncement. If the speaker is manufacturing high explosives in his basement, the confusion among the various meanings becomes obvious.
Where organizations are concerned, especially those, which
impact the lives of many people, the case that there is always some
degree of "publicness" is especially strong. In his perceptive
treatment of this subject, Bozeman says, "[a]ny organization,
whether government, business or some mix of the two, can be
viewed in terms of 'publicness dimensions." 6 Certainly this may
be said of CIDs. On the dimension of agency, there is a large body
of scholarship and policy writing concerning the relative
"governmentality" of CIDs and their activities. 7 At the very least,
CIDs are neither fully private nor public on this dimension. CIDs
are more governmental than the typical business enterprise and
less governmental than the United States Department of Defense.
On the question of access, CIDs have varying degrees of publicness. Some are open, but others, an increasing number, are gated,
walled or otherwise fortified to control entry.' 8 As to the dimension
of interest, CIDs appear to have many public aspects. The spread
of CIDs has a whole range of effects on local taxation, public
safety, the sense of community, and politics, all of which are of
wide Insofar
concern."
as CIDs represent a form of social organization affect-

16. See generally BARRY BOZEMAN, ALL ORGANIZATIONS ARE PUBLIC:
BRIDGING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONAL THEORIES (1987).

17. See MCKENZIE, supra note 4, at 22 (discussing the governmentality of

CIDs).

See also Rosenberry, supra note 6, at 69-74;

CONDOMINIUM

AND

HOMEOWNER

ASSOCIATION

WAYNE S. HYAr,
PRACTICE: COMMUNITY

ASSOCIATIONS LAW 6-7 (2d ed. 1988).
18. EDWARD J. BLAKELY & MARY GAIL SNYDER, FORTRESS AMERICA: GATED
COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (1997).
19. See, e.g., COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST xi (Stephen E. Barton & Carol J. Silverman eds.,
1994); RCA Characteristics and Issues, in RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM?
9-23 (Advisory Commission on Governmental Relations eds., 1989); ROBERT J.
DILGER, NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICS: RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS
AND AMERICAN GOVERNANCE 28-36 (1992).
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ing the "home," the rhetorical consequences of labeling their activities "private" are especially significant. Feminist scholars have
emphasized that dichotomizing public and private, placing the activities of the "home" in the private sphere and thus beyond the
reach of government, and relegating women to the home, effectively excluded them from political and economic power.2 0
In short, CIDs and their activities should not be considered
"private" and thus presumptively beyond the reach of "public" policy. 21 However, there are at least three common arguments
against public policy involvement in the activities of CIDs, each of
which is premised to some degree on the false dichotomization of
public and private." These are in the nature of "conversationstoppers" that serve to narrow the discourse concerning CIDs.
Each of these arguments merits consideration before proceeding
further.
One of these is the "defensible space" argument." Many CID
proponents contend that this form of social organization is a way
for people to protect their homes, their families, their property,
and their lives against predatory criminals.' This argument has a
strong natural law component and invokes images of the American
frontier. The underlying notion is that of using territoriality, or
control of space, to protect oneself.2 The work of Oscar Newman
27
"2
on "defensible space is often used to buttress this perspective.
Political scientist John DiIulio, originator of the label "superpredator" to describe certain contemporary juvenile delinquents,
and co-author of a recent book on criminal justice policy, 28 suggests
that recently declining crime rates may be partly attributable to
the spread of CIDs, particularly those of the gated variety. 9
20. See, e.g., DOLORES HAYDEN, REDESIGNING THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE
FUTURE OF HOUSING, WORK, AND FAMILY LIFE 62-63 (1984). See also ROBERT
FISHMAN, BOURGEOIS UTOPIAS: THE RISE AND FALL OF SUBURBIA x (1987)

(discussing "suburbia" as a part of the private sphere).

21. To clarify, "public" policy refers to the agency dimension, which is policy emanating from government.
22. Benn & Gauss, supra note 11, at 7-12.
23. See OSCAR NEWMAN, DEFENSIBLE SPACE (1973) [hereinafter DEFENSIBLE SPACE].

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. OSCAR NEWMAN, COMMUNITY OF INTEREST 5-6 (1980) [hereinafter
COMMUNITY OF INTEREST].
27. Robert Nelson, The Privatizationof Local Government: From Zoning to
RCAs, in RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM? 45-9 (Advisory Commission on Intergov-

ernmental Relations eds., 1989)
28. See generally WILLIAM BENNETT ET AL, BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY... AND How TO WIN AMERICA'S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS

(1996).
29. John DiIulio, Jr., A More Gated Union, THE WKLY. STANDARD, Jul. 7,
1997, at 13-15.
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This possibility has yet to be systematically tested. On the
other hand, there is empirical evidence to support the "broken
windows" theory put forth by James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling.3' This approach emphasizes the need to distinguish between
the fear of crime and "the fear of being bothered by disorderly
people," and argues that policing practices aimed at maintaining
order in public places reduce crime, because "[t]he essence of the
police role in maintaining order is to reinforce the informal control
mechanisms of the community itself." 1 That is, when people feel
safe in public places, believing that obnoxious strangers will not
likely accost them, they use or occupy these places, which reduces
actual crime rates.32 When people feel unsafe, anticipating being
bothered by unsavory characters, they avoid public places, which
leads to occupation by criminals, and thus rising crime rates.3'
In short, the "broken windows" theory militates in favor of
policies that would make the middle class feel safe in reclaiming
public places, rather than retreating into fortified enclaves. Consequently, there is no reason for CIDs to be insulated against public policy on the grounds that they are creating "defensible space,"
because it is at least possible that they are contributing to less safe
public places. In any event, the possibility that CIDs are related to
variation in overall crime rates, in any way, is a matter of general
concern, not an argument against public policy.
The argument thought of as the "reinventing government"
view evokes the image of CIDs as part of a "new" way of organizing
society that has emerged in post-industrial, post-modern America." This line of argument is premised on the entirely plausible
assertion that society is undergoing a broad restructuring of the
relationships between state, market and civil society. One then
proceeds to argue that an essential part of this restructuring is for
governments to function more like businesses.n
Accordingly,
criticizing CID government is tantamount to standing in the way
of progress and the inevitable forces of history, and is virtually a
form of Luddite protest.
One can see this line of thought in some CID literature with a
libertarian bent. The CID can be seen as Lockean, socialistic, individualistic, communalistic, or even anarchistic. But to date, libertarians have been most enthusiastic about the possibilities of

30. See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police
and Neighborhood Safety, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29-38
(discussing the broken window theory).

31. Id. at 29-30, 34.
32. Id. at 29.
33. Id. at 32.
34. DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT xvi

(1992).
35. See generally id. at 76-107.
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CIDs. In a sense, CIDs epitomize the libertarian public policy cycle
of the early 1980s, representing the notion that there was a better
way to do things outside of government. CIDs were, in this view, a
collaboration between the market and civil society, harnessing the
economic energies of real estate developers and the volunteer
spirit of small town America to create a new institution. This new
institution would be privately owned and governed communities
for the middle class, that would come to replace cities. In 1989,
economist Robert H. Nelson urged that CIDs be promoted in existing neighborhoods as a replacement for local government, so that
"[t]he RCA might in significant part replace the small municipality
as an institution for managing and controlling the immediate surrounding [neighborhood]." 6 Nelson points out that societies have
the choice of organizing their business activities publicly or privately, and that nations which had nationalized business activities
were now privatizing them.37 In much the same way, Nelson then
argues, "[e]ach society has the option of organizing its local residential communities on a public or private basis."m To date, in the
United States:
[t]he overwhelming choice.., has been to organize local governments publicly, creating municipal and other local governments;
however, the emergence of the RCA creates an important new private alternative. If RCAs were to become the prevailing mode of
social organization for the local community, this development could
be as important as the adoption in the United States of the private
corporate form of business ownership. We would have two basic
collective forms of private property ownership-the condominium
(or RCA) form for residential property and the corporate form for
business property.39
This proposal, Nelson observes, amounts to going beyond
"piecemeal and incremental privatization occurring in many municipalities," and realizing "a more systematic and comprehensive
privatization."4 °
However, the American idea that government would be better
if it functioned like businesses is not new, but virtually an American perennial. Much of the "wave of the future" rhetoric of CID
advocates, as well as the standard form of CID governance itself,
are excellent examples of what political scientist Deborah Stone
calls "the rationality project."" Stone argues:
[the fields of political science, public administration, law, and policy analysis have shared a common mission of rescuing public policy
Nelson, supra note 27, at 49-50.
Id. at 51.
Id.
Id.
Id.
41. STONE, supra note 2, at 6.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
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from the irrationalities and indignities of politics, hoping to make
policy instead with rational, analytical, and scientific methods. This
endeavor is what I call "the rationality project," and it has been a
core part of American political culture almost since the beginning.
The project began with James Madison's effort to "cure the mischiefs of faction" with proper constitutional design .... In the
1870s, Christopher Columbus Langdell, dean of the Harvard Law
School, undertook to take the politics out of law by reforming legal
training .... At the turn of the twentieth century, the rationality
project was taken up in spades by the Progressive reformers .... 42
In Stone's view, the rationality project has failed in all its incarnations, because "politics is a creative and valuable feature of social existence," and not a deviation from "hypothetical standards of
good policy making."'
As previously stated, the standard form of CID government is
a Progressive era creation, not a post-modern one. Pro-business,
anti-politics rhetoric was a staple of the Progressive era urban reformers and was the ideological basis for creating the city manager
form of government. In other words, the business corporation was
the model for the city manager system, and the city manager system then became the model for the CID's managerial government.."
In sum, on its merits, the claim that history demands that
government be pushed aside so that society can transcend politics
and get straight to rationality through business planning is not
only old, but at least questionable. The claim that CIDs are a part
of such an inevitable historical process is equally doubtful, and
should not dissuade policy makers from addressing otherwise legitimate concerns.
This is not to dispute either that an era of institutional restructuring is upon us, or that it is needed. Instead, it is a question of who is going to participate in the "reinvention" project. Who
should make the threshold determinations whether CIDs need to
be reinvented? Whose business is it to ask that question? Is it the
business of real estate developers and their attorneys, with others
involved merely as part of a market that may respond in various
ways to the reinvented product? Or, as argued, is this reinvention
project a matter in which public policy should be substantially involved?
Perhaps the most powerful argument advanced to limit government involvement in the governance of CIDs is the "liberty of
contract" perspective. As one radio call-in show listener purportedly stated, from his cellular telephone, "Why don't you mind your
own business? "Do you have something against a contract?" CID
42. Id. at 6-7.
43. Id. at 8
44. See MCKENZIE, supra note 4, at 45 (discussing this era).

1998]

Kratovil Seminar: Policy Role for the Judiciary

governing documents in the context of contract law is dealt with
below. However, there is a more general rhetorical argument that
contractual relationships should be somehow beyond the reach of
government. Of course, legal scholars know that this is not so, and
that public policy regulates and even prohibits many types of contractual relationships, such as those involving slavery, controlled
substances, child pornography, murder for hire and many other
subjects. The fact of agreement on the terms of a transaction does
not end the debate over the advisability of the underlying action.
Moreover, even in a specifically legal context, the "liberty of
contract" argument has been made and rejected before with reference to the kinds of agreements used in CID housing. These arguments are referred to as race restrictive covenants, which the
United States Supreme Court declared unenforceable in 1948, in
45
Shelley v. Kraemer.
So, the fact that CIDs are based on contractual relationships should not place them beyond the reach of public
policy.
The public policy dimensions of CID housing have not gone
unnoticed, particularly during the last three decades. In the next
section, some astute analyses of the subject are noted. However,
policy makers have been reluctant to treat the rise of CID housing
as a phenomenon over which they could and should be exercising
considerable influence, beyond simply facilitating or actively promoting its construction. Instead, the tendency has been to presume that the market actors involved in the production and maintenance of this housing should be allowed to arrange matters as
they saw fit. In part, this testifies to the power of policy arguments based on the private-public distinction. In addition to the
rhetorical arguments emanating from the "public-private" dichotomy, there is also a practical consideration: a special collective action problem inherent in this form of social organization, which
has forestalled a more comprehensive role for public policy.
III. COMMON INTEREST HOUSING AND THE POLICY AGENDA

A. A HistoricalPerspective of Common Interest Housing
An early social scientific analysis of CID housing was one of
the most perceptive. In the early 1960s, while CIDs still numbered
in the hundreds, and at the height of industry and government
concern over the rising cost of land and the loss of open space,
Stanley Scott, then Assistant Director of the Institute of Governmental Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, published
several papers on the rise of CID housing and its relationship with
local government. In the most systematic of these papers, he

45. 334 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1948).
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framed his thoughts as a critique of Federal Housing Administration (FHA) policy regarding CIDs, which he saw as so thoroughly
permeated with the views of the Urban Land Institute (ULI) that
he called it the "FHA-ULI homes association policy."6
Scott criticized the way CID ownership of common property
"bypasses the local governments that could appropriately be designated as custodians of such property," and he decried the
"policies of exclusiveness" that were "only thinly veiled as efforts to
'maintain high standards," or 'insure property values,' or provide a
'private community."' 7 With renters disenfranchised and FHA
recommendations against mixing single family homes and apartments
in
the
same
development,
he
anticipated
"'institutionalization' of segregated housing patterns.'
He expressed concern that developers had too much control over homeowner associations, and that the difficulties in making them work
effectively and responsibly had been understated. Scott also felt
that the emphasis on property values "may obscure other equally
important goals," and that the ULI and FHA were promoting CIDs
"despite their drawbacks.., partly because there has been a failure to invent more desirable alternatives." °
In a memorable and prescient passage, Scott tried to emphasize that the nation's housing policy was at a pivotal point. However praiseworthy, society has more important objectives than creating high quality, upper class, single-family, amenity-filled
communities with stable property values. 5' In the near future,
residential patterns and features will be rearranged and set.52 The
policies underlying these changes will determine the quality of urban life and the rule, strength, effectiveness, and perhaps even the
survival of local government.'
Scott recommended that homeowner associations be viewed
as "a stop-gap alternative that should be employed cautiously until
better arrangements can be worked out. "" In their stead, he suggested the temporary use of special taxing districts to maintain the
common open spaces and other facilities, or "an initial period of
joining public-developer stewardship," with eventual transition to

46. Stanley Scott, The Homes Association: Will 'PrivateGovernment' Serve
the Public Interest?, in COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES: PRIVATE Gov-

ERNMENTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 19-29 (Stephan E. Barton & Carol J.

Silverman eds., 1994).
47. Id. at 20.
48. Id. at21.
49. Id. at 20-21.
50. Id. at 21.
51. Id. at 27
52. Scott, supra note 46, at 27.

53. Id.
54. Id. at 28.
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public ownership.55 He felt the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations and other bodies interested in urban policy
should examine the matter, and he urged, "[w]hatever is done, it
should be done soon. Meanwhile the FHA and the developers, for
lack of a superior prototype, are methodically seeding many of the
best new urban communities with long-lasting automatic homes
associations."w
A 1994 retrospective analysis of Scott's early work on CID
policy, which compared his list of concerns with recent empirical
findings, found that his critique was remarkably accurate.57 Yet
Scott's recommendation to undertake comprehensive study of
CIDs, and his view that developers should not be allowed to institute permanent private governments, were not heeded, and the
spread of CID housing proceeded rapidly.
In 1971, the Twentieth Century Fund sponsored a thorough
review of the way the new towns of which Scott wrote were being
governed.' The study was premised on the idea that developers
had paid a great deal of attention to perfecting the physical and
financial aspects of new town development, but had "neglected the
problem of governance." 9 To remedy this defect and also spur innovation for existing cities, the task force recommended that new
towns become "laboratories for testing new forms and processes of
local self-government."0 This should involve experimentation with
"different and novel means of broadening and strengthening participation by people in planning, developing and governing their
urban environment."6 ' In order to help private community builders
accomplish all this, state governments were urged to "adopt
imaginative legislation to assure that new towns realize their full
potential for self-government." 2 Yet, public policy makers have
not seen to it that these ambitions be realized.
B. Review of CurrentPolicy Directions
All states have enacted some type of regulations concerning
common interest developments in the predominate form of con-

55. Id. at 29.
56. Id.

57. Stephen E. Barton & Carol J. Silverman, Common Interest Communities: Private Government and the Public Interest Revisited, in COMMON
INTEREST COMMUNITIES: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

31-40 (Stephen E. Barton & Carol J. Silverman eds., 1994) [hereinafter Public
InterestRevisited].
58. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, NEW TOWNS: LABORATORIES FOR

DEMOCRACY 3 (1971).
59. Id. at 6-7.
60. Id. at 8.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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dominium enabling legislation.6 3 These regulations are based on a
contractual model that focuses on "process-based" controls.6 Under this theory, state regulation of the contractual transaction
renders substantive regulating of contractual terms unnecessary.6 5
Legislation on disclosure, notice and voting requirements reflects
this promise.6 The ability to assess options and to voluntarily
choose to enter the community affords the consumer adequate protection. 7 Therefore, "consumer preference" and "market pressure"
supplement substantive regulation of these common interest developments
This is fundamentally correct. However, the distinction between substantive and process regulation can be improved upon
using Theodore Lowi's policy typology, which offers a convenient
and analytically familiar way of categorizing the various typical
state and federal process-based policies regarding CIDs.6 9 In
Lowi's framework, "distributive," or promotional, policy awards
benefits, subsidies, insurance, or other reward for behavior the
government wishes to encourage.
It works through individual
behavior and the likelihood of coercion is remote.7 "Regulative," or
regulatory, policy also tries to influence individual behavior, but
does so by applying some form of direct coercion, or sanction, for
behavior the government wishes to discourage, through administrative agencies or even the criminal courts.7 1 "Re-distributive"
policy works through changing the environment of conduct rather
than individual behavior directly, by means such as the system of
taxation and the Federal Reserve's influence over interest rates.7 3
"Constituent" policy changes the environment of conduct by
changing the74 structure of government itself, such as by creating a
new agency.
There are examples of all four types of policy to be found in
the ways governments have responded to the rise of CID housing. 5
63. Todd Brower, Communities Within the Community: Consent, Constitutionalism, and Other Failuresof Legal Theory in ResidentialAssociations, 7
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 203, 228 (1992).

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

J.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 229.
Id.

69. Theodore J. Lowi, Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice, 32 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 298, 300 (1972).

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Evan McKenzie, Homeowner Association Private Governments in

the American PoliticalSystem, No. 75, PAPERS IN POL. ECON., May 1996, at 8-

9 (discussing in further detail how Lowi's typology might apply to CID poli-
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Distributive policies would include the Federal Housing Administration's decisions in the early 1960s to offer mortgage insurance
for condominiums and planned unit developments, and later the
Department of Housing and Urban Development's provision of insurance for New Town construction. 0
Regulatory policies are to be found in virtually all states, and
include requirements for disclosure, record-keeping, financial accountability, and meetings, some applying to all non-profit corporations and others designed specifically for CIDs. However, in
most states there is no state agency to enforce the requirements
except during the period when the developer controls the project,
when the department that regulates real estate transactions is responsible. This is in keeping with the theory that only the transaction of purchase needs significant monitoring. Once the CID is
in the hands of the homeowner association, there is no state regulation except to the extent those requirements are enforced by private litigation. Only one state, Florida, has coupled its regulatory
policy with constituent policy and created a regulatory agency, the
Bureau of Condominiums, located in the Department of Business
Regulation. 77 The Bureau enforces the process regulations contained in the Florida Condominium Act throughout the life of the
association. 8
Perhaps the best example of a re-distributive policy is New
Jersey's Municipal Services Act, which requires municipalities to
reimburse CIDs for the costs of specified municipal services supported by tax revenues, if the CID owners are receiving parallel
private services instead, paid for through their homeowner association assessments.7" This policy was intended to prevent "double
taxation" of CID homeowners."0
IV. WHY LEGISLATURES WILL NOT ACT UNTIL IT Is Too LATE
Public policy has been kept at a more-than-respectful distance
from CIDs in part by the rhetorical claims described above, and
also because there is a collective action problem in this policy area.
The policy process in this subject area is dominated by organizations representing the economic interests that benefit from increasing CID housing without increasing government oversight of
their activities. Developers, property managers, and lawyers, especially those who provide professional services necessary to the
cies).
76. See MCKENZIE, supra note 4, at 96-105 (setting forth the history of this
policy decision).
77. Id. at 152.
78. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718 (West 1988).

79. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:67-23.2 (West 1992); McKenzie, supra note 75, at
21-23.
80. McKenzie, supra note 75, at 21-23.
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routine activities of CIDs, are able to pursue these policy objectives
through the Community Associations Institute and other smaller
organizations. However, individual homeowners, as distinct from
association directors, are unorganized, except for small insurgent
groups with little influence. 8
The interest group imbalance is not unusual in our political
system. Indeed, it is common for producers of a good or service to
be organized for political activity while the consumers of that good
or service are not. Mancur Olson argues that the reason for this
situation is a collective action problem.8 Since individuals are expected to protect their personal interests, it often assumed that
groups of individuals with common interests will likewise protect
those common interests.3 Logically, if a group has a common goal
and all members of the group would benefit from the achievement
of that goal, it is presumed that "rational" and "self-interested"
members of that group would act to realize that goal.'
However, this is not the case. In fact, Olson shows, "[u]nless
the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there
is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in
their common interest, rational,self-interested individuals will not
act to achieve their common or group interests."6' Large, diffuse interests tend to remain "latent" groups, while small, oligarchic interests are much more likely to organize to achieve common objectives.' Among the "forgotten groups" who "suffer in silence" are
consumers.87 Olson says, "[t]he consumers are at least as numerous as any other group in the society, but they have no organization" to countervail the power of organized or monopolistic producers.
In sum, it is easier to organize narrow oligarchic interests
where a small number of actors have high stakes, than to organize
broad, large, diffuse interests where many stakeholders have a
relatively small stake, even if the diffuse stake is many times
larger than the oligarchic one. The result is an imbalance in interest group politics. Just such an imbalance exists in the area of
CID policy. The privatization of complex government functions
and services that characterize CID housing creates a need for professionals to provide these services. These professionals are typical
81. See MCKENZIE, supra note 4, at 106-121 (discussing the interest group

imbalance, including the Community Associations Institute and its prominent
role in the political process where CIDs are concerned).
82. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 1 (2d ed. 1971).
83. Id.

84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 2.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 2-3.
Id.

88. OLSON, supra note 82, at 165.
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of Olson's small, oligarchic groups with strong economic incentives
to organize to further their interests. But CID homeowners are
simply consumers of a mass-produced commodity, and thus become another "forgotten" or "latent" group" which ends up suffering in silence. Consequently, the policy agenda regarding CIDs
reflects the preferences of the organized producers of CID housing
rather than the unorganized consumers.
The existing CID policies described above, promotion of the
continued growth of CID housing, minimal process-based regulations, and no regulatory agency, is very much in keeping with the
perceived interests of the groups that provide services to CID
homeowner associations. Indeed, the stated policy positions of the
Community Associations Institute (CAI) seek to reduce even the
existing level of state involvement in one important respect: access
to the courts.8 9 The Institute is on record as calling for alternative
dispute resolution in place of public courts, opposing the state licensing of community association property managers as real estate
agents or brokers, advocating discontinuance of all HUD regulatory agreements with Federal Housing Association (FHA) approved condominiums and opposing Federal Home Loan Mortgage
earthquake requirements for California condominiums. 9 In essence, the CAI opposes federal regulation, while accepting federal
promotional policies such as FHA mortgage insurance, and advocating on behalf of new federal tax benefits that would make CIDs
more desirable for consumers.9 CAI also opposes regulation by the
communities in which CIDs are located. 92 Rather, CAI supports
the minimalist regime of process regulations that typify state-level
regulation. The CAI considers local legislation over the creation or
policing of community associations as "antithetical" to the balancing of the associations' interests and as promoting a "patchwork of
regulations" within a state.9" Therefore, CAI advocates for effective state regulation when it is required for consumer protection,
conversion limitations, protections for ongoing operations or other
additions to existing state statutes or common law, to ensure that
community association housing is developed and maintained consistent with legitimate public policy objectives and standards that
protect individual consumers, balancing the legitimate rights of
the development community.
In the absence of strong state involvement, organized profes-

89. Community Associations Institute, Taking a Stand: CAI Public Policy
Positions (visited Jan. 22, 1998) <http://www.caionline.org/takingastant/ posi-

tions/pubpol.htm >.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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sionals are in a very powerful position with respect to CID residents, who by and large lack the specialized knowledge, time, staff,
individual profit motivation, and other resources possessed by
these professionals. These inequalities are further exacerbated to
the extent that these organizations engage in practices that could
reduce the level of competition still existing in their market. Such
an allegation gave rise to hints of an emergent federal regulatory
policy in June 1994, when the Federal Trade Commission issued a
complaint against the CAI.95 The complaint charged CAI with being a "combination" or "conspiracy" to restrain trade and competition in the provision of homeowner association management services." The complaint was resolved with a consent order requiring
the CAI to "cease and desist" from the particular activities involved, including other conditions, such as a five-year period of
federal monitoring."
There is a cautionary message implied in Olson's analysis, because he reminds us that policy makers should be alert to the existence of latent groups with interests that are not represented by
the actions of organized groups. At times these groups find ways
to express themselves outside of interest group politics. In the
short run, perhaps the policy that results is distorted in favor of
those with access to the institutional policy agenda. But in the
longer run, the needs that are on the systemic agenda, which include the concerns of the latent groups, may be expressed in social
movement politics, litigation, or other manifestations which are
unexpected from the standpoint of the oligarchic interests. The
American political system has been impacted by many such upheavals, including the Grange movement, the organized labor
movement, the civil rights movement, the anti-war movement, the
feminist movement, the environmental movement and the nuclear
disarmament movement. These are examples of diffuse interests
that somehow overcame the collective action problem and found a
way to organize.9 They are also examples of issue areas that have
been characterized by lasting patterns of strongly adversarial,
even openly conflictual politics.
V. POSSIBLE OUTCOMES OF THE "STATUS QUO"
The "status quo" of CID policy-making, then, is one in which
producer interests dominate the policy agenda. In such circum95. In re Community Associations Institute, F.T.C. No. C-3498 (June 6,
1994).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. OLSON, supra note 82, at 165-67.
99. There is a body of literature dealing with social movements and other
means of overcoming collective action problems, including sponsorship of
group activity by patrons.
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stances, these interests are able to control the degree and type of
state intervention in their industry. This has led to a situation in
which the policy agenda regarding CIDs does not reflect many of
the significant issues and concerns that actually exist and need attention.
This "status quo" has three possible negative outcomes, which
are called "emergence of an adversarial relationship with the
state," "failure from within" and "failure of demand." The word
"possible" is used because it is difficult to estimate the probabilities
of any one or combination of these scenarios. There are many
variables involved in each, and this analysis will not go beyond
stating how each might look.
A. Emergence of an Adversarial Relationship with the State
This scenario could result if significant numbers of CID owners overcome their collective action problem, if there is a hostile
judicial reaction, or if other political forces emerge in reaction to
overreaching by the CID industry that currently dominates the
policy agenda. The issue areas mentioned above, which resulted
from the activity of social movements, are replete with examples of
such adversarial relationships between government agencies and
particular economic interests. This scenario becomes more likely
the longer CID producer interests prevent reform efforts that are
actually needed.
B. FailureFrom Within
"Failure from within" is a scenario in which the CID industry
collapses, or implodes, and loses its ability to function properly, because this privatized institution becomes overwhelmed by the
challenges it faces. This kind of failure could lead to high levels of
insolvency of homeowner associations, defunct associations, and
abandonment of CID units and mortgages by their owners when
financial burdens of ownership become too great. Contributing factors might include failure of participation by owners as volunteer
directors; high rates of conflict and expensive litigation among the
various participants in CID housing; 0° and, perhaps most significantly, physical deterioration of the physical infrastructure of CID
communities.
As many authorities have noted, CID housing was a tiny per100. Assessment collection, suits for rule violations, construction defect
suits, and other litigation are already a matter of concern in places with large
numbers of CIDs. WARREN FREEDMAN & JONATHON B. ALTER, THE LAW OF
CONDOMINIA AND PROPERTY OWNERS' ASSOCIATIONS 127-40 (1992). Other

new conflicts may be emerging. For example, in Florida a dispute emerged
recently between property managers and lawyers over whether property
managers should be allowed to express opinions as to the meaning of CC&R
provisions.
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centage of the nation's housing stock before 1960, and still a small
one as late as 1970, so that a line representing the growth of CID
housing would show a relatively recent steep upward curve.'01
Millions of housing units were constructed in the same brief time
frame, much of it in newly developed areas that were heavily impacted by virtual "tsunamis" of housing construction. °2 The
prevalence of lawsuits over defective original construction testifies
to the problems that occurred when many builders were rushing to
get units to market. Available supplies of skilled laborers were
exhausted and there were insufficient numbers of housing inspectors. Given this history, the possibility of premature deterioration
of major building components must be considered.
To date, developers, who were sued by the homeowner associations they created; "third party" insurance carriers who insured
developers and subcontractors against liability resulting from their
construction projects; and the insurance carriers who underwrote
"first party" property insurance for homeowner associations have
borne major repair costs.' 3 Those sources of revenue will be less
available for aging CIDs, because statutes of limitation against
allegedly responsible parties are more likely to have run, and because it is doubtful that there will be insurance coverage for the
kinds of losses older CIDs will be facing over the next few decades.
"Normal wear and tear" is not ordinarily a covered loss. Firstparty property insurance carriers have rewritten policies and
fought in appellate courts to limit coverage for construction-related
losses.' ° Companies issuing liability insurance to developers have
done likewise.'0 5
Nonetheless, association boards of directors are required to
maintain and repair common areas and enforce physical standards
throughout the project.' Where there is no insurance carrier or
responsible party, they are expected to use regular and special assessments of the unit owners to accomplish this. Owners of CID
units are typically responsible for mortgage payments, property
taxes, homeowner insurance on the individual unit, and regular
monthly assessments, which include contributions to reserve funds
for replacement of major building components in the normal
course. 10 7 However, many associations are under-reserved, and in
101. McKenzie, supra note 75, at 1-2; Susan F. French, The Constitutionof a
Private Residential Government Should Include a Bill of Rights, 27 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 345, 347-48 (1992).
102. McKenzie, supra note 75, at 1-2.
103. FREEDMAN & ALTER, supra note 100, at 115-17.
104. See Joseph G. Blute, Analyzing Liability Insurance Coverage for Construction Industry Property Damage Claims, 7 No. 3 COVERAGE 1, 23-31

(1997)
105.
106.
107.

(outlining issues arising under insurance policy exclusions).
Id.
FREEDMAN & ALTER, supra note 100, at 115.
Id. at 81-91.

1998]

Kratovil Seminar: Policy Role for the Judiciary

that case, or whenever components wear out prematurely, the
homeowners must pay special assessments for those repairs.' °s
Consequently, it is possible that increasing numbers of associations will face the prospect of needing to make major building
repairs, and having inadequate reserves and no source of revenue,
other than assessing their members, to pay for it. This kind of
pressure, added to the existing level of conflict, and given the lack
of public involvement and support, could strain many associations
beyond the breaking point. This kind of institutional failure is not
without recent or related precedent. The savings and loan industry collapsed over a short period of time, which was not foreseen by
policy makers, and even in retrospect the disaster was difficult to
fully explain. 0 9
C. Failureof Demand
The "failure of demand" scenario contemplates the possibility
that the demand for CID housing could collapse. Negative press
coverage of CIDs could contribute to this unfortunate situation,
particularly to the extent that journalistic "conventional wisdom"
reflects a critical view of CIDs and their residents. One example of
this is the recent apparent tendency for CIDs to become subsumed
into the popular discourse concerning "gated communities."
As
Robert Frost said, in his poem Mending Wall:
Before I built a wall I'd ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out,
And to whom I was like to give offense.
Something there is that doesn't love a wall,
That wants it down."'
It is impossible to predict the nature of future press coverage
of this industry, or of future governmental regulatory action. But
the example of the tobacco industry should be kept in mind as one
instance of a group of producers who succeeded in forestalling
regulatory action for many years, and who now find themselves
heavily involved in adversarial politics, negative press coverage,
litigation and declining domestic market acceptance.

108. Stephen E. Barton & Carol J. Silverman, The Political Life of Mandatory Homeowners' Associations, in RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS:
PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM? 36 (Advisory
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109. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, RESOLVING THE THRIFT CRISIS, x-xi
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VI. A ROLE FOR THE COURTS: CREATIVE APPLICATION OF CONTRACT
LAW
The issue of when courts should become involved in solving
public policy problems is highly controversial and the subject of
considerable scholarship. It has been previously explained that
the legislative and executive branches cannot be expected to address CID issues adequately. However, it is possible that courts
could make an important contribution in this policy area, beginning by recognizing the collective action problem. Appellate courts
are sometimes faced with deciding whether to treat legislative inaction as democratic ratification, or considering the possibility that
the legislature is paralyzed by the shortcomings of the political
system, the structure by which citizens' concerns are translated
into items on the policy agenda.12 There is an approach that
would allow courts to address troublesome issues relating to CIDs
through contract law, without having to decide controversial constitutional questions.
For purposes of this article, there is difficulty and risk involved in making such determinations, but nonetheless judges and
legal scholars should give serious consideration to the notion that
such a situation may exist now, with respect to CID housing. If
that is so, some courts may wish to consider the following approaches to judicial intervention. These approaches are: 1) that
courts should not necessarily feel bound to enforce contractual
provisions supported by only the standard objective manifestations
of contractual assent; 2) that CID governing documents are contracts of adhesion and should be subject to certain remedies proposed for such contracts; and 3) that these documents should be
viewed as part of the "product" for purposes of applying doctrines
of product liability law.
A. Assent and Consent
As noted above in the section on "freedom of contract," it is often argued that government should not become more assertively
involved in CID issues, because those who participate in such arrangements do so voluntarily. But the hybrid nature of CIDs, and
their recent rapid growth and institutional evolution, have tended
to conflate two different kinds of voluntary arrangements: "assent"
to a contractual arrangement, and "consent" to be governed.
"Voluntariness" in the ordinary law of contracts requires
simply that there be certain objective manifestations of assent to
the agreement, such as a signature on a writing containing the
112. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-36 (1962) (discussing the clearest
example of this situation that lead to this decision). This situation pertained
to United States Supreme Court's internal struggle over whether to address
the issue of mal-apportioned legislative districts. Id.
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terms. A party who has signed an agreement is presumed to have
read and understood its terms, and in general the other party can
expect courts to enforce the terms of the agreement against the
signatory."' The signatures prove that these parties have structured the agreement as they chose, and the role of the courts is
just to see to it that the promises are kept.
But the concept of consent in liberal democratic political theory is more complex and has more substantial consequences, because it is linked to the idea of legitimacy. The state is not just an
enforcer of personal obligations, but is directly involved in the
"social contract," either as a party or as the entity created by the
parties."' The contract is a constitution. Consent of the parties to
that contract gives rise to the state, which, among its other duties,
decides whether people have made objective manifestations of assent to contracts. Being governed involves delegating discretionary power over some aspects of one's life, but not others, to people
who act through the state. Consent and its limits are often contested, generally as matters of constitutional law and even to the
point of civil war. But in liberal democratic theory, when consent
is present, its presence grants legitimacy to the enforcement of
governmental decisions. When consent is absent, such actions are
simply the use of superior force.
Because of these crucial differences, assent to a contract is, in
an important sense, subordinate to the larger question of consent
to be governed. Seeking enforcement of a contract based on assent
is merely one claim among many that people make on a legitimate
government, but consent is the very basis for the government's
claim it is legitimate. In other words, the entire law of contract
depends upon consent, but consent does not depend on any aspect
of the law of contract.
However, because they are in certain respects privatized local
governments, CIDs raise an unusual question: what if a contract
amounts to an agreement by one person to be governed by another? In that circumstance, what should be the measure of
"voluntariness?" Is the ordinary contract law standard of objectively manifested assent enough? Or should something more be required, in view of the fact that the agreement implicates issues
that are normally adjudicated under constitutional law?
The current judicial practice with CIDs is to gauge

113. Kessler, supra note 1, at 630-31.
114. Hobbes argued that individuals in a state of nature agree among themselves to be governed by the state. Michael Rosenfield, Contract and Justice:

The Relation Between Classical Contract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70
IOWA L. REv. 769, 791 (1985). But Lockean contract theory more closely re-

sembles an agreement between society and the state in which the state agrees
to limits on its powers. Id. at 787-90.
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"voluntariness" by the low standard used for contractual assent.11 5
While this facilitates the enforcement of business promises, and
thus promotes energetic commerce, when applied to CC&R promises it produces outraged homeowners and bitter litigation. Courts
could legitimately require that government by a community contract1 6 be supported by something more substantial than the
showing of assent one might offer to enforce the purchase of a
truckload of chickens.
This could involve judging some covenants by the contractual
standard of assent, and others by the higher standard of consent,
and judges would make a threshold decision as to which standard
to apply. Some basic CC&R provisions, such as the obligation to
pay regular assessments, are straightforward, easily understood,
and necessary to the association's survival. Judges could enforce
those provisions as they do now, based on a showing of assent.
However, where associations seek to ban political activity or expression, limit communication, or' otherwise intrude into areas of
protected rights and liberties, courts would be justified in demanding that the association carry a heavier burden of proof. An example of this burden of proof includes proving that the defendant
knowingly, voluntarily and expressly waived the rights or liberties
in question. This could be implemented easily. Developers and
associations seeking to enforce provisions that infringe basic liberties might develop waiver forms that could be used to prove such
waivers. Criminal court judges make such determinations all over
the country every day with respect to guilty pleas, time waivers,
and other procedural steps.
As a second step in helping to reform CIDs, courts should also
take into account the fact that the agreements in question are adhesion contracts.
B. Government by Adhesion Contract
The argument for judicial action regarding government by
contract becomes stronger because the parties who create the contracts in question, such as real estate developers and their attorneys, are organized professionally and politically, and have standardized the terms of the governance agreement to a substantial
degree. The result is that government by adhesion contract is now
an institutionalized arrangement affecting millions of people.
Quite apart from any discussion of CC&Rs, some legal scholars have argued that all adhesion contracts should be given special
treatment by judges. The model contract of adhesion (sometimes
referred to as "standard form contract" or "standardized agree115. McKenzie, supra note 75, at 3-4.
116. Charles S. Ascher, How Can a Section of Town Get What It is Prepared
to Pay for?, THE AMERICAN CITY, June 1929, at 98-99.
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ment"" has the following seven characteristics:
(1) The document whose legal validity is at issue is a printed form
that contains many terms and clearly purports to be a contract. (2)
The form has been drafted by, or on behalf of, one party to the
transaction. (3) The drafting party participates in numerous transactions of the type represented by the form and enters into these
transactions as a matter of routine. (4) The form is presented to the
adhering party with the representation that, except perhaps for a
few identified terms (such as the price term), the drafting party will
enter into the transaction only on the terms contained in the document ....(5) After the parties have dickered over whatever terms
are open to bargaining, the adherent signs the document. (6) The
adhering party enters into few transactions of the type represented
by the form-few, at least, in comparison with the drafting party.
(7) The principal obligation of the adhering party in the transaction
considered as a whole is the payment of money.""
Adhesion contracts have become an integral, and some believe
an essential, part of an economic system that is based on mass
production and distribution. However, they are only useful because
they contradict the basic assumption that the contract is the embodiment of a bargain. The efficiency gains of adhesion contracts
come in large part from the elimination of bargaining over the
terms of individual transactions. The Restatement of Contracts
notes that usually a seller using a standardized form does not anticipate that his customers will read, let alone understand, the
terms of the contract.119 Indeed, if customers retained counsel to
review the terms, then the purpose of the standardized form to
eliminate bargaining over details would be eliminated."0 Employees who use the form may not understand the terms, and often
have little authority to alter them."' Customers rely on the "good
faith" of the party and on the "tacit representation" that other customers in lieu of reading the terms regularly accept such contracts. 2 Nonetheless, customers realize that they are12 3agreeing to
those standard terms, subject to any legal restrictions.
In some cases, both parties to the contract are producers,
merchants, or other individuals engaged in commercial enterprise,
and could reasonably be expected to be familiar with the industry's
standardized agreements. In other cases, as with CIDs, the
drafter is in the real estate development business and the typical
adherent is a consumer, who cannot reasonably be expected to
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1979).

118. Todd Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96
HARv. L. REV. 1173, 1177 (1983).
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (1979).
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know and understand all the terms of the standardized agreements or how they have been judicially interpreted.
Eminent legal scholars have discussed how judges and lawyers should regard adhesion contracts. In 1943, Friedrich Kessler
wrote his seminal article on the subject,"M in which he related the
way such contracts evolved. Case law reveals that a contract is a
private, not a social, transaction.12 5 Therefore, the courts will only
interpret contracts, not make them.'26 A party must agree to the
contract to be legally bound, but only "objective manifestations of
assent" are required.12 A party is assumed to understand the contract he enters into and protect his own interests." Oppressive
terms can be "avoided by carefully shopping around.""
Judicial deference to the substance of contracts is based on
these factual predicates, because in such circumstances, "[t]here is
no danger that freedom of contract will be a threat to the social order as a whole ....

Influenced by this optimistic creed, courts are

extremely hesitant to declare contracts void as against public policy ....

"130

However, Kessler explains, circumstances have changed.
"The development of large scale enterprise with its mass production and mass distribution made a new type of contract inevitable-the standardized mass contract." "1' Once these contracts were
perfected and their usefulness demonstrated, they spread from
transportation, insurance and banking into "all other fields of
large scale enterprise," including labor relations, and now common
interest housing. 3 Indeed, Kessler could almost have had CIDs in
mind when he wrote,
[f]reedom of contract enables enterprisers to legislate by contract
and, what is even more important, to legislate in a substantially
authoritarian manner without using the appearance of authoritarian forms. Standard contracts in particular could thus become effective instruments in the hands of powerful industrial and commercial overlords enabling them to impose a13 new feudal order of
their own making upon a vast host of vassals. 3
Judges could and should be involved in preserving fundamental social values against erosion by adhesion contracts. However,
Kessler says, to date courts have approached that task in the
124. Kessler, supra note 1, at 629.
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wrong way."3 "Handicapped by the axiom that courts can only interpret but cannot make contracts for the parties, courts had to
rely heavily on their prerogative of interpretation to protect a policy holder."3 ' This practice helped them to reach "just" decisions
and protect the weaker party, but also led to "highly contradictory
and confusing law" in the interpretation of insurance contracts and
other standardized agreements.'m Instead, he argues that when
interpreting adhesion contracts, courts must determine both the
legitimate expectations of the weaker party for services and the
extent to which the stronger party failed to meet those expectations based on "the typical life situation.""7 The resulting need to
rewrite the terms of the contract does not introduce a new role for
courts." Judge made revisions of contracts have occurred in the
area of constructive conditions.'3 9 This area of law has also refuted
the argument that the sole difference between an express contract
and a contract implied in fact is that the party's intention is
"circumstantially proved.""0
However, this approach requires judges to overcome their inbuilt deference to the dogma of freedom of contract. Adapting the
common law of contracts to contracts of adhesion must be solved
through direct action."' This cannot be accomplished unless courts
confront their "emotional attitude" concerning freedom of contract."4 Judicial rationalization for this attitude is the "main obstacle of progress."" Courts insist that social desires must give
way to "legal certainty" and "sound principles of contract law."'"
However, this dicta is unnecessary since the rules of common law
afford courts the flexibility to consider a community's sense of justice. '4 Freedom of contract provides flexibility so parties may
shape an individualized contract; the "rule and counter-rule" competition of the common law provides flexibility so courts may
"follow the dictates of 'social desirability".' 4
Kessler argues that in doing this, judges should consider the
"social importance of the type of contract" in question, and "the degree of monopoly enjoyed by the author. " 147 But recently, Professor
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Todd Rakoff of Harvard Law School has argued that Kessler's approach did not go far enough, because it was based on the notion
that adhesion contracts were essentially an extension of monopoly
power.'8 Instead, Rakoff urges, "the form terms present in contacts of adhesion ought to be considered presumptively (although
not absolutely) unenforceable."'4 This practice is justified because
adhesion contracts are fundamentally a different social practice
than "ordinary" contracts, and should be viewed as "a coherent social and legal institution" that requires a "new analysis.""' Even
an individual who reads and understands the terms of a contract
may perceive himself to be essentially helpless, and rightfully so. 151
The consumer does not experience freedom of contract propounded
by traditional contract law. 2 Instead the consumer experiences
only the freedom to choose the organization by which he will be
dominated.'
The use of contracts of adhesion itself generates and
allocates power, even though not market power."' Therefore, it is
no longer enough to consider these contracts to be legal forms
"operating as a transmission belt of monopoly power." 5' Contracts
of adhesion give organizations freedom from legal restraint and
power to control market relationships. 156 The legal support given to
the use of adhesion contracts must be judged with this effect in
mind."7
This analysis would shift the burden to the drafter of the form
agreement to prove that the term should be enforced. Rakoff proposes a particular set of steps for judges to follow that "can be employed not only to show grounds for non-enforcement of form
terms, but also to establish appropriate, limited grounds for enforcement.""8 In short, "[t]he rule should thus be that to justify enforcement of any form term to the extent that it deviates from
background law, cause must be shown.""9
It is not necessary to believe that all adhesion contracts, or
even all consumer-as-adherent contracts, need special judicial
treatment, in order to see that the CID government-by-adhesioncontract presents a particularly strong case for the remedies that
have been proposed for such contracts. However, CID contracts
can be seen as an example of why, as Rakoff puts it, judges need to
148. Rakoff, supra note 118, at 1217-20.
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create "a new legal structure" that reflects "an open recognition
that contracts of adhesion represent a different social practice
from 'ordinary' contracts." ° Rakoff concludes, that the judicial
and legislative systems are now confronted with the task of creating this "new legal structure." l6 1 To do this, they must stop apologizing for not adhering to traditional contract law.' 6 1 Only then
will they begin to create "something of use, then perhaps of
beauty. " " While the past quarter-century has witnessed creativity in the field of adhesion contract, "it needs to be greater still."'6
VII.CONCLUSION
If courts became more involved in the substance of CID contracts, producers would be forced to justify their practices in ways
they do not at present. These producers would be challenged to do
better, and perhaps to live up to their democratic rhetoric. For example, the industry might voluntarily adopt "plain language"
CC&Rs, as insurance companies began to write "plain language"
insurance policies."6
In any event, there is little risk involved in undertaking such
a project. Indeed, as previously argued, the "policy gap" that has
been described may lead to disastrous consequences. Restructuring CID private government would make it a stronger institution,
more consistent with accepted social, legal and constitutional values, and probably would make such housing more acceptable to
many residents and less generative of conflict and litigation.
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